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RECENT DECISIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL--Applicability of Mandamus to
Pollution Abatement-Roy v. Farr (Vt. 1969).
In 1967, the Vermont Department of Health notified the local
health board of Richmond, Vermont, of an unhealthful condi-
tion within its area, resulting from the discharge of raw sewage
by a citizen into an open gully. Operating under 18 VT. STAT.
Aw.. § 6061 the Richmond health officer notified the offender
that he was to remove the unhealthful condition within thirty
days or be subject to action by the city under 18 VT. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.2 Nineteen months thereafter, neither the offender nor the
local board of health had taken further steps to eliminate the
health hazard, and consequently, in February 1968, the plain-
tiff petitioned the Supreme Court of Vermont for a writ of
mandamus3 to compel the Richmond board of health to abate
the existing unhealthful condition.
In deciding this case, the Vermont court interpreted 18 VT.
STAT. ANN. § 609 to be a ministerial statute. This, in combina-
1. 18 VT. STAT. ANN. § 606 (1959) provides:
The health officer shall make sanitary inspections when and where
he has reason to suspect that anything exists which may be detri-
mental to the public health. He may enter any house or other
building or place for the purpose of making such inspections. By
written order he shall direct the destruction or removal within a
specified time of unhealthful conditions or causes of sickness; and
shall in all things conform to the rules and regulations of the board.
2. 18 VT. STAT. ANN. § 609 (1959) provides:
A person who neglects or refuses to comply with a written order
of a local board of health or health officer issued under this chap-
ter, when no other penalty is provided, shall be fined no more than
$100.00 or less than $5.00. Upon such neglect or refusal, the local
board of health may prevent, remove or destroy any unhealthful
conditions or causes of sickness, at the expense of the town it
represents, and such expense may be recovered of the person whose
legal duty it was to comply with such order.
3. The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ at law and is available
only under a narrow set of circumstances. Broadly defined it will issue from
a court of competent jurisdiction to require a person, officer, corporation,
lower court, or other body acting in an official capacity to perform an act
which the law views to be a mandatory duty. See 55 C.J.S. Mandanus § 1
(1948). It must be established that the duty sought to be enforced is com-
pletely ministerial and in no way judicial or discretionary in nature. Courture
v. Selectmen of Berkshire, 121 Vt. 359, 361, 159 A.2d 78, 80 (1960); Car-
penter v. Brown, 118 Vt. 148, 152, 102 A.2d 331, 333 (1954). It must be estab-
lished that the right of the petitioner to have the duty enforced is clear and
unequivocal. Town of Bennington v. Booth 140 A. 
157 (Vt. 1928). Ait m st be established that there is no other adequate remedy available to right
the alleged wrong. Town of Glover v. Anderson, 120 Vt. 153, 16, 9134 A.2d
612, 616 (1957).
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tion with the court's findings that the plaintiff had an une-
quivocal right to relief and that no other adequate remedy
was available, placed the fact situation squarely within the
scope of mandamus; the court properly could have granted the
petition at this point. However, the court chose instead to com-
pletely mask the importance of any discretionary element with-
in the local health boards authority, and founded its decision
upon a well recognized exception to the ministerial requirement
of the writ-i.e., that if the facts otherwise justify the writ,
mandamus will lie to control discretionary authority which has
been abused.4 The court held that the failure of the local health
board to take action to abate an unequivocal health hazard
amounted to an arbitrary abuse of its lawful authority and that
consequently mandamus would issue. Roy v. Farr, 258 A.2d 799
(Vt. 1969).
Roy v. Farr did not involve the plaintiff's right to have the
health hazard abated. On this point the court stated as a matter
of law, "[tihe petitioner has a clear right not to be subjected to
the unhealthful condition determined . . . to be a public health
hazard."I5 Instead the petition was resisted, first, on the ground
that the removal of the unhealthful condition under 18 VT.
STAT. ANN. § 609 is not a ministerial duty since the word
"may" allows the health board to exercise its judgment and
discretion, and secondly, on the ground that the petitioner had
an adequate remedy available through an action against the
offending landowner for abatement of a public nuisance.
Proctor v. HufnailO was cited in support of the defendant's
first contention. In Hufnail the parents of a school child sought
by mandamus to compel certain school officials to alter a school
bus route so that use of the bus would be equally as convenient
for their child as it was for other children. The court in Huf-
nail ruled that mandamus would not lie because the word "may"
in the contested public law7 made the school board's authority
discretionary. The court in Roy v. Farr, however, distinguished
Hufnail on its facts saying, "[t]he particular action to be taken
4. See 55 CJ.S. Mandamus § 63 (1948).
5. 258 A2d at 802 (Vt. 1969).
6. 111 Vt. 365, 16 A2d 518 (1940).
7. Vermont P.L. 4269 as amended by No. 89, section 6 of the Acts of 1935
provides:
Each legal pupil ... may be furnished with such total or partial
transportation... as is in the opinion of the school directors rea-
sonable and necessary to enable him to attend such school, as
required by law.
1970]
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required an inquiry into the surrounding facts followed by an
exercise of [the school board's] discretion, reasoning, and best
judgment. . . This is not the situation in the instant case.""
Having distinguished EufnaiZ, the court held that the only
discretionary acts manifested by the Richmond health board
stemmed from 18 VT. STAT. ANN. § 606. Under this section the
local health officer had a prerogative to act, first by making an
inspection of the offending premises, and next by deciding that
an unhealthful condition did in fact exist. The court stated that
after these decisions had been made, and notification issued to
the offender ordering abatement, that enforcement of the order
under 18 VT. STAT. ANN. § 609 required neither an inquiry of
fact nor an exercise of judgment or discretion.9
Having judged 18 VT. STAT. ANN. § 609 to be ministerial, the
court seemingly could have addressed itself to the second ques-
tion, that of other adequate remedies, and then could have pro-
ceeded to a decision on the case. The court declined, however,
to take this route and summarily dismissed the importance of
whether the statute was ministerial or discretionary. The court
stated that the interpretation of "may" in the statute was imma-
terial to the case, and that the question actually to be decided
was "whether there was an abuse of the power vested by the
statute in the board of health by its neglect or refusal to
act .... 110
This removed the crux of the case from the ministerial-
discretionary arena and placed it instead within a well recog-
nized exception to the discretionary prerequisite of mandamus
-i.e., where the facts show an arbitrary abuse of the power
vested by law in an official or board and this abuse amounts to
a virtual refusal to act or perform a duty imposed by law,
mandamus will lie in the absence of other adequate legal reme-
8. Roy v. Farr, 258 A.2d at 802 (Vt. 1969).
9. In making this determination the court did not mention Medlar v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 248 A.2d 740 (Vt. 1968), dealing with the interpretation of "may" in
24 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1092 (1959). In this case the same court, one year
earlier, invoked the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, stating that
the plain meaning of the statutory language must be applied unless to do so
would manifestly defeat the object of the statute; accordingly the court ruled
that the plain, ordinary meaning of the word "may" indicated that the statute
in question was permissive and not mandatory in its character and applica-
tion. To be in consonance with this holding, it must be assumed that the court
in Roy v. Farr believed that to construe 18 VT. STAT. ANN. § 609 to be per-
missive would have defeated the object of its provisions and that consequently
thc plain meaning of "may" could be overlooked.
10. Roy v. Farr, 258 A2d at 803 (Vt. 1969).
[Vol. 22
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dies.1 ' In finding for the plaintiff, the court noted that the
board's failure to take steps to remove the admitted health
hazard was "an arbitrary abuse of its lawful authority."'
2
The remaining issue, the availability of another adequate
remedy, was then quickly disposed of. The court, citing Glover
v. Anderson,'3 said that in order to supersede mandamus an-
other remedy must not only be able to alleviate the problem but
also must be "equally convenient, beneficial and effective."'
4
Applying this test to a remedy based on public nuisance, it
found first that the plaintiff, on the facts, could not establish
an injury distinct from that suffered by the general public,15
and further, that even if a cause of action could be established
the expense and inconvenience of a private suit would be viola-
tive of the requirement that any other remedy be equally con-
venient, beneficial, and effective.'
6
In Roy v. Farr the application of the writ of mandamus
under the facts is not novel as to the technical aspects of the
writ itself; however the application of the writ to the abate-
ment of a health hazard has little precedent.17 Within the nar-
row area of health hazards Roy v. Farr exhibits a decided wil-
lingness on part of this judiciary to facilitate a swift, sure
remedy. This willingness can be seen both in the court's refusal
to be hampered by the technicalities of statutory construction
and in its desire to emphasize that inaction in this area is an
abuse of official authority. It is interesting to speculate that
other jurisdictions may also apply the speedy and efficient
remedy of mandamus to their pollution problems and to other
similar nuisances. The facility with which this may be done
11. Id. at 802; Courttre v. Selectmen of Berkshire, 121 Vt 359, 361, 159
A.2d 78, 80 (1960).
12. Roy v. Farr, 258 A2d at 803 (Vt 1969).
13. 120 Vt. 153, 134 A.2d 612 (1957). This case involved mandamus pro-
ceedings to require the Vermont Auditor of Accounts to reimburse the Town
of Glover for funds spent in aid to a non-settled incompetent. The court gave
judgment for the plaintiff, finding the alleged debt to be valid.
14. Town of Glover v. Anderson, 120 Vt. 153, 160, 134 A.2d 612, 616
(1957); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 17(b) (1948).
15. Pilgrim Plywood Corp. v. Melendy, 110 Vt 12, 16, 1 A.2d 700, 702
(1938); W. Paossm, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 89 at 608 (3d ed.
1964).
16. It is difficult to imagine a remedy more convenient, beneficial, and
effective from a citizen's standpoint than a judicial mandate ordering abate-
ment of a condition at the instance and expense of the municipality. Yet this
is the accepted yardstick for determining the adequacy of an alternate remedy.
See 34 Am. Jur. Mandamus § 44 (1941) ; 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 17 (1948).
17. See State e- rel. Shartel v. Humphreys, 338 Mo. 1091, 93 S.W.2d 924
(1936); State ex rel. Glatfelter v. Hart, 106 Neb. 61, 182 N.W. 567 (1921).
1970]
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will depend in large measure upon the seriousness with which
the courts view our environmental problems and their belief in
the necessity of strong governmental action in this area."'
Jom B. GRnn u
18. Mandamus is not the remedy generally invoked to abate a public
nuisance as there are usually discretionary elements within the scope of the
duties of those officials responsible for abatement. Injunctive relief would be
the natural alternate. See Costas v. City of Fond Du Lac, 24 Wis2d 409, 129
N.W2d 217 (1964), dealing with injunctive relief as to a nuisance caused by
an odorous sewage facility. See generally Schmitz, Pollution, Law, Science,
and Damage Awards, 18 Crxv.-Mm. L Rv. 456 (1969).
[Vol. 2
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TORTS-Negligence-City Housing Authority as landlord of
privately sponsored housing complex had the responsibility to
provide adequate police protection for its tenants once it had
assumed the duty to provide such protection. Bass v. City of
New York (Sup. Ct., N.Y. 1969).
Plaintiff was the father of a nine year-old girl who lived in
a sixteen acre housing complex owned and operated by defend-
ant Housing Authority. Immediately after returning from
school, plaintiff's daughter was seized near the rear entrance
of one of the ten buildings composing the project. Thereafter,
she was hauled to the roof, some fourteen stories in height,
raped, and subsequently dropped to her death when she refused
to remain silent as to the occurrence of the attack.
Section 402 of New York's Public Housing Law' gives the
Housing Authority the "right" to provide and maintain a uni-
form police force with all the powers incident to that of a city
police force. Defendant freely elected to assume the formation
and obligations of such a force.2 Upon these facts the Bass
court, sitting without a jury, held that the City Housing Au-
thority did not discharge its obligation to protect its tenants,
once such obligation was voluntarily assumed, by merely pro-
viding one police officer for the entire project, and that it was
liable in tort for its negligence. Bass v. City of New York, 305
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1969).
Prior to Bass a duty to protect another from criminal attack
has been found in contract law through voluntary assumption
of the duty. A typical case is Kansas, 0. and G.R.R. v. Pike3
where plaintiff's contract of employment provided for his pro-
tection in case of strike. The court held that defendant was
liable under contract law for failure to provide adequate pro-
tection. Another area where a duty to provide protection has
been found is in an economic-business relationship. An exam-
ple of this is Neering v. Illinois Central Railroad4 where the
court held that defendant owed a duty to plaintiff passenger,
who was waiting for her train, to protect her from attack by a
tramp. The court categorized the danger created by the presence
of tramps as within the requirement to keep the railroad station
in a reasonably safe condition for use.
1. N.Y. Public Housing Law § 402 (McKinney 1955).
2. 305 N.Y.S.2d 801, 811 (1969).
3. 264 S.W. 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
4. 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
1970]
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Apparently, Bass is the first case to impose liability after
voluntary assumption of protection in the area of landlord-
tenant law. There is one prior decision similar in facts to Bass
that involved a landlord-tenant relationship, Goldberg v. Hous-
ing Authority of City of Newark.5 In Goldberg the plaintiff, a
millanan, was beaten and robbed in a self-service elevator about
8:00 a.m. while making deliveries to a city housing project of
some 19.5 acres. The Newark Housing Authority had provided
three guards on a shift schedule; these guards were on duty
continuously excepting the hours between 8:00 am. and 4:00
p.m. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought suit against the Housing
Authority for failure to provide him protection against criminal
attack.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, by a 4-3 decision, held
that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff to provide protection
from criminal attack.( There is one major distinction between
the Goldberg and Bass cases, namely, that in Goldberg the New
Jersey statute which created the Housing Authority did not
impose any duty, power, or right upon the Housing Authority
to provide protection for the residents of its project.7 In Bass,
however, the statute which created the City Housing Authority
gave it the right to provide protection, a right which it elected
to exercise.8
The dissenting opinion in Goldberg was most persuasive to
the Bass court.9 The dissent maintained that the Newark Hous-
ing Authority's duty to give protection was decided solely on
stare decisis. The Goldberg dissenting opinion stated:
[Where there are special conditions which the owner
or operator of the premises should recognize and fore-
see an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or dan-
ger to invitees from criminal or wrongful acts of
others, he must take reasonable precautions which
5. 38 NJ. 578, 186 A2d 291 (1962).
6. Id. at 581, 186 A.2d 291, 292 (1962).
7. The court reasoned:
The first reason is that we should not find the owner of property
is liable for not furnishing police protection to deter invading
criminals unless we also find he has the right to provide a police
force to that end. We do not see how we can find the right in
view of the statutes which vest in government the power to consti-
tute police forces, with certain exceptions, referred to above, which
do not include the owner of residential property. 38 NJ. at 588,
186 A.2d at 296.
8. 305 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
9. rd. at 808.
[Vol. 22460
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may, under the circumstances, fairly and justly entail
the employment of special guards or police.10
Although the Bass court 'was careful to stress the fact that the
Housing Authority had voluntarily assumed the duty of protec-
tion 1 a reading of the case in its entirety gives the impression
that the Bass court found that defendant's duty of protection
should be imposed because of the totality of circumstances and
problems coincident with housing projects of that nature. The
relevant circumstances were a history of frequent and serious
crime throughout the project; the reliance placed in the single
policeman caused the residents of the project to be especially
vulnerable because of their false sense of security; the Housing
Authority had made no effort to obtain assistance, which was
available, from the New York City police; the project itself was
saturated with crime so that only the particular victims of
future crimes were unknown, not if and when such crimes
would occur.
Serious questions are raised by the Bass decision, albeit the
decision is narrow in scope because the court found liability
based on the enabling statute. Perhaps statutory provisions
could be designed to preclude the future Bass problems by des-
ignating a responsible agency charged with the duty of provid-
ing protection within similar housing projects. If it is deter-
mined that protection should be provided by an agency such as
a housing authority, then consideration should be given to addi-
tional funding so that a realistic quantity and quality of pro-
tection may be given. A more preventive, if not creative, ap-
proach would be the utilization of several small multi-family
units so that a large number of persons would not be crowded
into one massive dwelling.
In that crime is directly related to the degree of law, order,
and poverty within our society these problems demand not only
attention, but solutions as well. Effective crime prevention is
not defined by the number of arrests made, but rather it entails
the objective realization of the conditions which breed crime,
and the effective use of our existing resources. Until government
manifests its efforts in programs that are apposite to cause,
rather than vocal to result, one need not expect a lasting solu-
tion. Responsible representatives would do well to employ fore-
sight coupled with anticipatory pragmatism rather than to view
retrospectively with apologetic "benign neglect."
RICOA D N. TAPP
10. 38 NJ. at 597-98; 186 A.2d at 301 (1962).
11. 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1969).
1970]
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss3/10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEW
REAL PROPERTY-Implied Warranty in Sale of Real Prop-
erty-In sale of residential real estate by builder-vendor there
is an implied warranty that land and terrain are stable for
support of a residence for its first buyer and occupant. House
v. Thonton (Wash. 1969).
The plaintiff purchased a house from defendant builder-
vendor which, after 23 months of occupancy, became unfit for
further habitation resulting from instability of the land and
terrain on which the foundation of the dwelling rested. Three
months after purchase, following a period of heavy rains, the
plaintiffs observed a three-eights inch crack develop in the
earth running the length of and parallel to the east wall of the
house. The following year another crack in the yard opened up
and the earth settled about three inches near the north end of
the house. Then the steps and basement wall separated, and the
seam between the chimney and the house opened so that day-
light showed through it into the living room. The walkway to
the patio separated four to five inches for a distance of twenty
feet. The basement bulged, and the floor cracked and dropped
six inches. Another crack opened up in the basement wall.
Before building on the lot, the vendor-builder had checked
with the city engineer's office, ascertaining that although the
land was on a fairly steep slope, it was considered to be stabil-
ized and that there had been no contrary indication for fifteen
years. There had once been slide problems but responsible offi-
cials decided that the slides were the result of septic tanks
draining from higher lots. These tanks had been disconnected
and a city sewer had been installed.
During the deterioration of the dwelling, the builder treated
the soil with plastic sheeting to reduce the moisture content of
the subsoil, separated the drain tile flow from the downspouts,
and connected fire hoses to lead the water away from the base-
ment. On the advice of the builder, the purchaser dug a trench
in the yard to drain it. Despite all efforts, the house became
untenable and unfit for further occupancy as a dwelling. The
plaintiff brought suit seeking to rescind the sale on the theory
of fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court found no overt
misrepresentation nor deceit but granted rescission, deducting
reasonable rental for 39 months occupancy, on the ground that
the defendants knew of prior soil slippage. In affirming the
trial court's judgment for the plaintiff the Supreme Court of
Washington, held, that where a vendor-builder sells a new house
[Vrol. 22
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to its first intended occupant, he impliedly warrants that the
foundations supporting it are firm and secure and that the
house is structurally safe for the purchaser's intended purpose
of living in it. House v. Tomton, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969).
Washington has taken an advanced position by applying the
theory of implied warranty to real estate sales. In so doing it
has joined the vanguard in the evolution away from caveat
emptor.
Generally, in the absence of contrary stipulations, every real
property deed warrants that the vendor has good title, but, in
the absence of express provision, there is no warranty as to the
physical condition of the property. The rationale of caveat
emptor in the sale of real property is that the buyer can exam-
ine the property himself and that he should obtain an express
warranty to protect against defects.' In addition some have
voiced the fear that recognition of implied warranty would
result in a rash of litigation. Critics of caveat emptor have
pointed out that the vendee usually will not discover latent
defects.2 In addition, these critics point out that most buyers do
not realize the necessity of retaining an attorney to handle the
purchase nor to insist upon express warranties. While recogni-
tion of implied warranty in real property transactions would
result in increased litigation, such a result is not to be con-
demned where the unwary buyer has a legitimate claim.
In recent years the courts have held the builder-vendor liable
for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title
and possession on one or more of three theories: implied war-
ranty3, an imminently dangerous condition caused by negli-
gence in construction4, and concealment or failure to disclose to
the vendee a condition which involves unreasonable risk to
1. See Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of
Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633 (1965).
2. Id.
3. Carpender v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Bethlahmy
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Week v. A:I'4 Sunrise Const.
Co., 36'Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 768 (1962); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A2d 314 (1965); Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio
App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Old.
1963); Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D.
1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1968); Moore v. Wermer,
418 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1967); Hoyle v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d
830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
4. Burgess v. Conejo Valley Development Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1967);
Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 270, 321 P2d 736 (1958); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A._d 314 (1965) ; Lowe v. Francis Const.
Co., 373 P.2d 849 (Okl. 1961); Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E2d
81 (1968) ; Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W2d 705 (1961).
1970]
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persons on the land." Some courts have held the builder to the
rule of strict liability for defective construction causing injury
or loss to the vendee or other persons.6
In Loma Vista Development Oo. v. Jonson,7 the court ruled
that a builder-vendor, by offering a house for sale as a new and
completed structure, impliedly warranted that it was properly
constructed of good material. Similarly, the Ohio court in Van-
dershrier v. Aarons found in the construction contract that the
builder-vendor impliedly warranted that the house would be
completed in a workman-like manner and reasonably fit for its
intended use. This rule was extended in Carpender v. Donooe9
to apply to a purchaser of a completed house.
Texas, in Humber v. Morton,'0 followed Carpender and held
that the doctrine of caveat emptor had no application to the
sale of a new house by a builder-vendor. New Jersey joined the
assault in &ekipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.," which involved an
action by the purchaser's lessee whose son was injured by exces-
sively hot water drawn from a bathroom faucet. The complaint
alleged negligence and implied warranty of builder-vendor in
5. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965) provides that:
(1) "A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his
vendee any condition whether natural or artificial which involves
unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is subject to liability to
the vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the vendee
or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the condition after
he has taken possession if; (A) the vendee does not have reason
to know of the condition of the risk involved, and (B) the vendor
does not know or has reason to know of the condition and realizes
or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that
the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk. (2)
If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in
subsection (1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has rea-
sonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Other-
wise the liability continues only until the vendee has had reason-
able opportunity to discover the condition and take such precau-
tions."
See also Belote v. Memphis Development Co., 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W12d 441
(1961); Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E2d 81 (1968).
6. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A2d 314 (1965); see
also Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969), which in-
volved a latent defect in positioning of pipes of a radiant heating system,
leading to the injury of a subsequent purchaser in repairing the system.
7. 142 Tex. 686, 177 S.W.2d 225 (1943).
8. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
9. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P2d 399 (1964).
10. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
11. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). See also Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49
Cal. 2d 270, 321 P.2d 736, (1958), which held general contractor-vendor liable
to survivors of the second family which occupied the four year old home for
death of family members from carbon monoxide poisoning caused by a defec-
tive gas heater.
[Vol. 22
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installing the hot water distribution system without a mixing
valve. In finding both theories applicable, the court stated:
When a vendee buys a development house from an
advertised model . . . he clearly relies on the skill of
the developer and on its implied warranty that the
house will be erected in a reasonable workable manner
and will be reasonably fit for habitation. . . . If there
is improper construction prepared by the building sys-
tem ... the well being of the vendee and others is
seriously endangered.
In Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc.,I2 the South
Dakota court ruled that the builder-vendor could be liable to
purchasers under an implied warranty of reasonable workman-
ship and habitability even where there was no evidence that
builder-vendor knew of the existence of an underground spring
which caused damage to the dwelling by water seepage. The
court held, however, that the test for breach of warranty was
reasonableness and not perfection, and the duration of liability
is likewise determined by a standard of reasonableness.
In Fain v. Nelson,'L the Washington court had refused to
find an implied warranty for a defective roof, where the pur-
chaser was experienced in real estate dealings and admittedly
realized the importance of having roofs inspected and neglected
to do so. In Hoyle v. Century Builders,14 the court did find an
implied warranty that a completed house would be fit for
human habitation where the builder represented himself as
experienced, and furnished plans for the house which the pur-
chaser selected. In Hoyle, the court limited its decision to the
custom built home under a construction contract.
In House, the Washington court recognized that its previous
decisions did not reach the determinative issues before it in the
instant case. Since an implied warranty is imposed by law to
impel just results between the parties,15 the court recognized
that the developer is better able to handle the burden of loss and
stated that nothing could be more vital to a dwelling than the
stability of its foundation. Although the court found the de-
12. 154 N.W2d 803 (S.D. 1967).
13. 57 Wash. 2d 217, 356 P.2d 302 (1960).
14. 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P2d 474 (1958). In Hoyle, the sewage facilities
were inadequate.
15. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio 1958).
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fendants to be free of fraud and misrepresentation and that
there was no evidence of poor work or the use of shoddy ma-
terials,10 the fact remained that the defendants sold and turned
over to the plaintiffs a brand new residence which was unfit
for occupancy. Borrowing an equity principal to justify holding
the builder liable, the court noted that it was the builder-
vendor who made the harm possible.
House recognized the inequity of a system which conscien-
tiously protected the purchaser when he brought small items but
left him to the mercies of caveat emptor when he purchased a
home.1 ' This decision could well serve as a springboard to hold
the builder-vendor liable also to any subsequent purchaser
rather than just the immediate purchaser. Such a result could
be attained by applying strict tort liability or by permitting the
warranty to run with the property for a reasonable duration of
time."' The subsequent purchaser, clearly the most innocent of
all parties, would be the one to bear the complete costs of latent
defects which could go unnoticed for the first few years of
occupancy. Unless so expanded, the builder would enjoy a
windfall when the original purchaser sold the property.
California has already adopted the strict tort liability rule in
Kriegler v. Eichder Homes, Ino.19 The case involved a latent
defect in the positioning of pipes of a radiant heating system.
The court held that the defendant was liable to the subsequent
purchaser when the heating system failed, necessitating exten-
sive repairs to the house. This rule will certainly insure greater
care in home construction and provide needed protection of the
vendee's property and family welfare.
Jomf B. AIiN, JR.
16. Judge Hale, in the lower courts opinion, noted: "I frankly have
been impressed with both sets of clients in this case. I have been
impressed with Mr. House and I have also been impressed with
the Thorntons. I was thinking this afternoon if I had a house to
build, I am not sure I wouldn't call Mr. Thornton at some stage
and let him take a look at it. I am impressed with his con-
scientiousness in approaching the problems in this house.. ..
17. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Hous ng Mer-
chant Did It, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 835 (1967).
18. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-318 (1966) Third Party Benwficiaries of War-
ranties Express or Inplied--"A sellers warranty whether express or im-
plied extends to any natural person who may be expected to use,
consume or be affected by the goods and whose person or property
is damaged by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section."
It is realized by the writer that the U.C.C. does not apply to real property,
but it is suggested that such a theory could theoretically be applied to real
property transactions.
19. 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
[Vol. 22
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LABOR-Police Unionization-Since policemen are not consid-
ered as a group distinct from other public employees for the
purpose of applying the Michigan Public Employment Rela-
tions Act, they have the right to affiliate with the Teamsters
Union as their exclusive collective bargaining representative.
City of Escanabav '. Michigan Labor Mediation Board. (Mich.
Ct. of App. 1969).
The police officers of the city of Escanaba wanted to join
Local 328, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America. Local 328 petitioned
the Michigan Labor Mediation Board (hereinafter referred to
as ILMJB) for an election in a unit of all patrolmen and
sergeants of the Escanaba police department, pursuant to the
provisions of the Public Employment Relations Act' (herein-
after referred to as PERA). The city objected to such an elec-
tion; however, the MLMB determined that a unit of patrolmen
and sergeants was appropriate for bargaining and ordered the
election. The police officers and sergeants voted in favor of
being represented by Teamsters Local 328.
The city refused to bargain with the Teamsters Union, which
filed an unfair labor practice charge against the city for viola-
tion of PERA.2 The City Council then adopted a resolution
stating that it would not recognize as bargaining agents for the
police officers any labor union that included persons or interests
other than law enforcement or police officers. MIMB ordered
the city to recognize and bargain collectively with Local 328.
The city filed a complaint for review pursuant to the provi-
sions of section 16(e) 3 of the PERA, and a petition for enforce-
ment of the bargaining order was likewise filed by IMLMB
pursuant to the provisions of section 16(d) 4 of the PERA. The
order from the hearings required the city to recognize Local 328
as the exclusive representative of the police force. The Michigan
Court of Appeals reviewed that order and, held, that the
Board's action permitting police membership in the Teamsters
1. MicH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 423201 et seq. (1967).
2. MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 423.210(a) & (e) provides that it is unlaw-
ful for a public employer to interfere with the public employee's right to
unionize and to refuse to bargain collectively with employee's representative;
MicH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 423.216 provides remedies for unfair labor prac-
tices by giving the MLMB power to regulate disputes by formal hearings.
3. MicH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 423.216(e) grants the court of appeals the
right to review board decisions.
4. MicH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 423.216(d) grants the board the right to
petition court of appeals for enforcement of an order.
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Union was valid. City of Escanaba v. Michigan Labor Media-
ti n Board, 172 N.W.2d 836 (Mich. Ot. of App. 1969).
The law with respect to the unionization of police and other
law enforcement officers is presently in a stage of rapid devel-
opment and fluctuation. These changes are partially a result
of recent developments in the law dealing with unionization of
public employees in general. The problem becomes even more
complex in the case of police officers (and firemen) 5 who his-
torically have been viewed by the courts with particular scrutiny
and who in many cases have been denied rights to organize
which have been given to other classes of public employees.6
The courts have been especially reluctant to overrule regula-
tions which prohibit policemen from becoming members of
organizations which allow persons other than policemen to
join.7 For example, in Fraternal Order of Police "v. Board of
Police d- Fire Commissioners," the court held that permitting
policemen to join a fraternal organization which accepted non
policemen as associate members and which gave a "car emblem"
as part of membership privileges was against public policy. The
court noted that police officers owe their undivided loyalty to
the public at large, not to a small group of organization mem-
bers, and that "[o]ne would be naive, indeed, to assume that such
automobile emblem did not carry with it the intimation of spe-
cial privileges to associate members."" Other courts have usually
upheld rules regulating and prohibiting the right of policemen
to organize on the grounds that law enforcement officers are a
group peculiar from other public employees and that union
membership might be inconsistent with the discipline that such
employment requires and, therefore, detrimental to the public
welfare."o
5. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 (1953).
6. See Perez v. Board of Police Com'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P.2d 537
(1947); Local 201, State, County, and Municipal Employees v. City Muske-
gon, 369 Mich. 384, 120 N.W.2d 197 (1963); Fraternal Order of Police v.
Board of Police & Fire Comrs, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W.2d 310 (1943); King
v. Priests, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W2d 547 (1947); Hutchinson v. Magee, 278
Pa. 119, 122 A. 234 (1923). Cf. San Antonio Fire Fighters Union v. Bell, 223
S.W. 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
7. Perez v. Board of Police Com'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d, 638, 178, P.2d 537
(1947); Local 201, State, County, & Municipal Employees v. City of Mushe-
gon, 369 Mich. 384, 120 N.W.2d 197 (1963); Fraternal Order of Police v.
Board of Police and Fire Com'rs, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W2d 310 (1943).
8. 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W.2d 310 (1943).
9. Id. at 70, 10 N.W.2d at 312.
10. E.g., Coane v. Geary, 298 I1. App. 199, 18 N.E2d 719 (1939); City of
Escanaba v. Michigan Labor Mediation Bd., 172 N.W2d 836 (Mich. Ct. of
App. 1969) (dissenting opinion) ; Hutchinson v. Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 A.
234 (1923).
[Vol. 2
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The recent advent,'1 however, of public employment relations
acts and of constitutional amendments which bar discrimination
on the basis of union membership, have introduced much insta-
bility into this area of the law. Through these statutes and
amendments, several states have granted public employees the
right to join labor organizations. 12 The question has now arisen
whether police obtain the right to unionize under the new legis-
lation or whether the courts will continue to consider them as
a special group and restrict their right to unionize. Only four
jurisdictions,13 including the Michigan court in Escanaba, have
as yet had to face this problem. However, the few cases' 4 on
point do show a trend towards interpreting these new statutes
and amendments so as to give policemen the same rights and
privileges as other public employees. In the Arkansas case of
Potts v. Hay'3 and the South Dakota case of Levasseur v.
Wheeldon,16 the courts refused to consider policemen as a special
class of public employee in interpreting state constitutional
amendments which gave them the right to unionize and to select
the union of their choice. Texas, which by statute allows unioni-
zation but not collective bargaining, has also refused to distin-
g ish between policemen and other public employees.
1'7
A few states have attempted to avoid the problem by spe-
cifically excluding policemen and other classes of employees
from their public employment relations act.' 8 A recent decision,
however, may indicate that even in these states the court will
take a more liberal view. In City of Medford v. Teamsters LocaZ
446,19 the court stated that "[olur holding here [is] that law
enforcement officers, while prohibited from joining a union can,
nevertheless, be represented by a union in conferences and nego-
11. Most public employment relations acts have been enacted since the late
1950's. 48 Am. Jun. 2D Labor & Labor Relations § 1192 n.1 (1970).
12. ARK. CONST. amend. XXXIV; S.D.CoNsT. Art. 6, § 2. For a compre-
hensive listing of the 15 state statutes which permit public employees to
unionize, see 48 A.m. Jup. 21) Labor & Labor Relations § 1192 n.1 (1970).
13. Potts v. Hay, 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958); City of Escanaba
v. MLMB, 172 N.W2d 836 (Mich. 1969); Levasseur v. Whelldon, 79 S. D.
442, 112 N.W.2d 894 (1962); Beverly v. Dallas, 292 S.W2d 172 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1956).
14. Id.
15. 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958).
16. 79 S.D. 442, 112 N.W2d 894 (1962).
17. Beverly v. Dallas, 292 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
18. 48 Am. Jur. 2]) Labor & Labor Relations § 1191 n.7 (1970). ANN.LAVs
oF MAss. Ch. 149 § 178D, VERNON'S Mo. STATS. ANN. § 105.510, GEN. LAWS
oF R.I. § 36-11-1, and Wis. STATS. ANN. § 111.70 (b) specifically exclude
various law enforcement officers from the statutes.
19. 42 Wis2d 551, 167 N.W.2d 414.
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tiations with their municipal employer... 20 Thereby, the court
granted the Medford policemen the right to designate the Team-
sters Union as their representative in bargaining situations (for
changes in wages, hours, and working conditions) although they
are statutorily precluded from actually becoming members of a
labor organization. 21
Likewise, the Escanaba court interpreted a public employment
relations act on the status of policemen. At issue was whether
public policy still demanded that policemen be considered as a
distinct group of public employees, who were forbidden from
associating with unions composed of persons not law enforce-
ment officers. Justice Danhof in the majority opinion stated
that "section 9 [of PERAI 22 supersedes any prior public policy
of this State established by statutes, the courts, or general con-
sent regarding public employees joining unions. Therefore, if
city policemen are public employees they may join labor organi-
zations which include in their membership persons who are
neither policemen nor public employees." 23 Because the term
public employees as defined in Section 2 of the PERA24 con-
tained no exception for law enforcement officers, the court then
determined that policemen were public employees within the
scope of the act and entitled to affiliation with whatever union
they might choose.
In a strong dissent Justice Holbrook contended that the court
should have construed public policy as stated in the previous
decisions of Fraternal Order of Police v. Board of Police &
Fire Commissioners25 and LocaZ 201, State, County, & Munici-
val Efmployees v. City of Muskegon2" and presented persuasive
arguments that police departments should not be subject to the
20. Id. at 556, 167 N.W.2d at 419.
21. Wis. STATS. ANN. § 111.70(1) denies law enforcement officers the right
to unionize.
22. Micn. CoMiP. LAvs ANN. § 423209 provides that "[ilt shall be lawful
for public employees to organize together ... in labor organization . .. for
the purpose of collective negotiations or bargaining... through representa-
tives of their own free choice."
23. 172 N.W.2d at 840.
24. Mic . Comp. LAws ANN. § 423.202 provides:
"No person holding a position by appointment or employment in
the government of the state of Michigan, or in the government of
any one or more of the political subdivisions thereof, or in the
public school service, or in any public or special district, or in the
service of any authority, commission, or board, or in any other
branch of the public service, hereinafter called a 'public employees,'
shall strike."
25. Note 8, supra.
26. 369 Mich. 384, 120 N.W.2d 197 (1963).
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same rules as other branches of the government. He cited LocaZ
201 which held that city police chief's regulation forbidding
police unionization with any organization permitting non-police
members was reasonable and constitutional.
In that case the court distinguished the organization of police-
men from other public and private employees (except perhaps
fireman) in that such police regulations are required for a "fair
and impartial administration of the law by those entrusted with
its enforcement without discrimination or partiality."27 Judicial
notice was taken of the fact that police are often required to act
as neutralizers between labor and management in controlling
strikes and industrial disputes, and affiliation with a particular
group could lead to a definite conflict of interests.
The dissent further contended that police officers and ser-
geants of Escanaba could be considered public officers, not em-
ployees, pursuant to the charter and ordinances of the city28 and
that a determination of this point was essential to any meaning-
ful decision. He quoted McQuillin's work on Municipal Cor-
porations by stating, "'It has been said that policemen may be
either officers or employees, as the local legislative department
may determine. A majority of the cases announce that members
of a police department, including commissioners, superintend-
ents, the chief of police, police sergeants, watchmen, constables,
special policemen, and patrolmen, are public officers." 29 The
IMLAfB did not, however, consider this possibility; nor did the
Escanaba majority ever mention it. Moreover, there appears to
be no case which denies police labor organization on this
ground.
Previously the courts had held that public policy demanded
that policemen be considered a special class of public employees
required to surrender certain rights to organize in order to give
full allegiance to the public. Since the enactment of public
employment relations acts and constitutional amendments guar-
anteeing the right to unionize, the trend in interpreting these
laws seems to be towards considering police attempts at labor
organization on the same basis as attempts by other public
employees.
M. CARENGTON SALLEY
27. Id. at 390, 120 N.W2d at 203.
28. Blynn v. City of Pontiac, 185 Mich. 35, 151 N.W. 684 (1915).
29. 172 N.W2d at 843 citing 16 E. McQuIunA, MUNIcIPAL CoaRonATioxs
§ 45.11 at 661 (1951).
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EDERAL INCOME TAXATON-Liability for Tax Due on a
Joint Return-Wife is not liable for income tax deficiencies on
a joint return, where deficiencies were assessed on funds em-
bezzled by husband without wife's knowledge. Huelsmn v.
Commissioner (6th Cir. 1969).
Petitioner and her husband filed joint income tax returns for
the years 1963-1965. The returns failed to report income in the
form of funds embezzled by the husband from his business
associates.' Petitioner took no part in and had no knowledge of
her husband's criminal actions. She obtained no benefit directly
or indirectly from the embezzled funds and her standard of
living apparently was not changed in any way.
Pursuant to section 6013(d) (3) of Internal Revenue Code of
1954,1 2 the Commissioner assessed income tax deficiencies against
petitioner for those years. The petitioner appealed to the Tax
Court for review of the Commissioner's determination. Based
on the statute and its prior decision in Louise H. iSudder,3 the
Tax Court held petitioner liable for the deficiencies. 4 On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in remanding
the case to the Tax Court, ]heZd that if a husband, without
knowledge of his wife, embezzled money from his business asso-
ciates, and the embezzled money was not included in joint in-
come tax return, the wife was not liable for tax deficiencies
arising therefrom. Huelsman . Commissioner, 416 F.2d 477
(6th Cir. 1969).
Prior to Huesman the law in this area, although seemingly
1. His activities in obtaining these funds led to his conviction in November,
1965 in a Kentucky court upon an indictment charging that he had obtained a
little more than $100,000 under false pretenses. He pleaded guilty, was sen-
tenced to a year in jail, and sentence was suspended on condition that he make
restitution and remain on good behavior for five years. Shortly thereafter, the
wife filed suit for divorce which was granted in February 1967. His where-
abouts at the time of the Tax Court decision were not revealed by the record,
and the Court of Appeals inferred that the Government's tax claim could not
be collected from him.
2. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6013(d) (3) reads: "if a joint return is made,
the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with
respect to the tax shall be joint and several."
3. 48 T.C. 36 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968),
aff'd on rehearing sub nons., United States v. Scudder, 410 F.2d 686 (6th Cir.
1969). The Tax Court held spouse liable in factual situation similar to princi-
pal case contending that for the defense of fraud to lie, the signature must be
the product of the fraud. The Court of Appeals reversed on the technicality
that the funds illegally obtained by the husband were not in fact embezzled
and therefore could not be considered as income for tax purposes. Dictum in
the opinion, however, indicated that the court would have granted the innocent
wife relief whether the funds had been embezzled or not.
4. See Betty Bell Huelsman, Paragraph 68,095 P-H Memo T. C.
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unjust, appeared to be well settled. The allowance of filing the
joint return came as early as 1918,i but the question of liability
for the taxes due on a joint return was unsettled until a much
later date. The Board of Tax Appeals first sustained the con-
cept of joint and several liability in Frida Helhnan Cole 6 on the
grounds that not only was it impossible to compute the separate
tax liabilities of each spouse from the return filed, but also that
apportioning tax liability according to separate incomes of the
spouses would be substantially the same as allowing the filing
of separate returns after spouses had committed themselves to
the joint return. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
did not agree, however, and reversed the Board of Tax Appeals
in Cole v. Commissioner.7 The court based its opinion upon a
broad interpretation of the 1928 Revenue Acts, since at that
time there was no specific provision in the statutes on which to
base a joint and several liability argument.
8
Cole was generally followed by the courts for several years.9
But upon the authority of Moore v. United States ° and section
51(b) of the Revenue Act of 1938,11 the courts retreated to the
position previously taken in Frida Hellman Cole. Subsequent
decisions have generally adhered to the concept of joint and
several liability without regard to the spouse's knowledge of,
benefit from, or contribution to the aggregate income. 12 As a
result, taxpayers finding themselves in factual situations similar
to Huelsman, have not been fortunate enough to escape the
harshness of the joint and several liability requirement im-
posed by the courts.13 The significance of Huelsnam can be
appreciated when compared to these cases.
In Huelsman, the court was unwilling to impose such a harsh
5. See Revenue Act of 1918, § 223, 40 Stat. 1074.
6. 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933).
7. 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935).
8. The joint and several liability provision first appeared in § 51(b) of the
Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 476.
9. See Sacks v. Commissioner, 111 F2d 648 (6th Cir. 1940); Commis-
sioner v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639 (2nd Cir. 1940); Crowe v. Commissioner,
86 F2d 796 (7th Cir. 1936). But see United States v. Rosebush, 45 F.Supp.
664 (E.D. Wis. 1942).
10. 37 F. Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
11. The provision was the same as the present INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 6013(d) (3).
12. See Horn v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1967); Moore v.
United States, 360 F2d 353 (4th Cir. 1966); O'Dell v. United States, 326
F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1964); Spanos v. United States, 323 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.
1963); Cirillo v. Commissioner, 314 F2d 478 (3rd Cir. 1963); Howell v.
Commissioner, 175 F2d 240 (6th Cir. 1949).
13. See. e.g., Howell v. Commissioner, 175 F2d 240 (6th Cir. 1949).
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decision on an innocent spouse and remanded the case to the
Tax Court. The court, speaking through Judge Combs stated:
We are not prepared on this skimpy record to affirm
the Tax Court's judgment when that court frankly
admits it is "appalled at the harshness of this result."
We are not convinced, as we were not convinced in
Soudder, that the statute is so inflexible that an inno-
cent wife who has been victimized by a dishonest hus-
band must be subjected to an additional appallingly
harsh penalty by the United States Government. We
are not prepared to admit that the Executive branch of
our Government is so impotent or the Judiciary so
ineffectual that relief may not be granted to such a
victim.
14
The court reasoned that the wife was a victim of her hus-
band's fraud or trickery and therefore should be able to assert
this fraud or trickery as a valid defense, especially since it was
shown that the wife did not benefit from the embezzled funds.
It was pointed out that courts have previously recognized mis-
take, duress, trickery and fraud as valid defenses if the wife's
signature was shown to be the product of such conduct.' 5 The
dissent contended that the Tax Court had no equitable jurisdic-
tion and questioned its power to grant what it considered as
equitable relief suggested by the court. The court countered this
argument by asserting that the Tax Court apparently recognizes
mistake and duress as valid defenses' 6 and that these are gen-
erally considered to be equitable defenses. The court contended
that relief from trickery and fraud could just as well rest on the
same principle.
The Commissioner argued that petitioner's liability was based
on a contract and that by signing the joint return she assumed
a role somewhat related to a surety or guarantor. The court con-
sidered this argument to be fallacious since petitioner was
fraudulently induced to sign a return which she obviously would
not have signed had the embezzled money been included in it.
And since the presence of actual fraud has historically been
considered as grounds for relief to the aggrieved party, peti-
14. 416 F.2d at 480.
15. See Furnish v. Commissioner, 262 F2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Payne v.
United States, 247 F2d 481 (8th Cir. 1957); Louise M. Scudder, 48 T.C. 36
(1967).
16. See Hazel Stanley, 45 T.C. 555 (1966); Irving S. Federbush, 34 T.C.
740 (1960) ; Estate of Merlin A. Aylesworth, 24 T.C. 134 (1955).
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tioner would not be held liable. The court further asserted that
its interpretation of the statute and seemingly that of the Tax
Court as well, was that one who signs a joint return becomes
liable as an individual debtor and not as a surety or guarantor.
The crux of the decision, however, lay upon judicial interpre-
tation of Internal Revenue Code section 6013(d) (3). The court
was convinced that Congress did not desire that the section be
interpreted so as to inflict an appallingly harsh result on an
innocent person. To this end, the court, as previously discussed,
created an exception to the general rule for the situation where
the wife had no knowledge of her husband's wrong doings and
received no benefit therefrom. The court pointed out that esser
tial to the Tax Court's decision was the legal fiction that em-
bezzled money is income to the wrongful taker.1 When Con-
gress in 1954 enacted the present Internal Revenue Code, the
Supreme Court was adhering firmly to the rule that embezzled
funds were not to be considered as income for tax purposes.1 s
Therefore, the court questioned how it could be concluded that
Congress intended in 1954: that joint and several liability be
extended to taxes due on embezzled funds.
Furthermore, the court contended, it is often held, at the
insistence of the Government, that substance should prevail over
form. The form of this case was that petitioner in good faith
signed a joint tax return with her husband and technically be-
came liable for the tax due on the return. The substance was
that the embezzled money was not income to the wife in the
usual sense of the word and she did not benefit from it directly
or indirectly. The court concluded that the Government should
be just as diligent in protecting the innocent taxpayer as it is in
pursuing willful tax evaders.
The dissenting opinion, while confessing to have compassion
for the petitioner, was unwilling to grant her relief. It pointed
out that the jurisdiction of the Tax Court is purely statutory
and as such has no general equitable jurisdiction.19 The dissent
considered the relief suggested by the majority to be equitable
and therefore, not within the power of the Tax Court to grant.
The dissent further asserted that the Circuit Court has only the
function of review and is not empowered to take any action
17. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
18. See Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
19. See De La Garza, 46 T.C. 446 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 378 F.2d 32
(5th Cir. 1967).
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prohibited to the Tax Court.20 Upon this theory the court could
only grant relief for one of the previously recognized defenses,
where the taxpayer's signature was the product of mistake,
duress, trickery or fraud.
Moreover, the dissent did not agree with the court's liberal
interpretation of Internal Revenue Code section 6013(d) (3). It
contended that requiring a spouse to know of the understate-
ment or non-reporting of income in order to be jointly and
severally liable on a joint return would divest the code section
of any meaning. It would ascribe to the Congress a vain act in
providing for the vicarious liability of a person who would, in
the absence of section 6013(d) (3), be liable as a principal. For
this reason, the dissent would adhere to a strict interpretation
of section 6013(d) (3) and would leave amelioriation of the
statute to remedial legislation.
In the past, the law as to the liability of a spouse for the
taxes due on a joint income tax return has been harsh and
unfair. Reasons offered for justification of the imposition of
joint and several liability have been wholly unsatisfactory when
balanced against the injustice of subjecting an innocent spouse
to its harshness.21 Huelsman offers a liberal interpretation of
section 6013(d) (3), and if other circuits follow the Huelsman
court, the harsh results previously obtained under a strict inter-
pretation of section 6013(d) (3) will no longer confront the
already distressed taxpayer.
22
HENRY H. TAYLOR
20. See Taylor v. Commission, 258 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1958).
21. The law in this area has also been vigorously attacked as unconstitu-
tional. See Note, The Joint Return and the Innocent Wife, 29 U. PirT. L. Rnv.
351 (1967).
22. But see Estate of Upshaw v. Commissioner, 416 F2d 737 (7th Cir. 1969).
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CIVIL PROCEDURE-Removal-Right to remove a case under
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) is limited to plaintiff's defendants and is
not available to third party defendants. Fiblenkli v. Hirschbace
Motor Lines, Inc. (E.D.Ark. 1969).
The plaintiff filed suit in the Arkansas circuit court for
property damage and cargo loss totaling $20,000 resulting from
a collision between plaintiff's tractor trailer and defendant's
similar vehicle. There was complete diversity of citizenship be-
tween plaintiff and defendant, and defendant could have re-
moved the case to the federal district court under the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), but he chose to answer in the state
court. The defendant also filed a third party complaint against
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company alleging negligence and
breach of warranty in connection with the manufacture and sale
of an allegedly defective tire. The third party complaint sought
judgment over against Firestone should plaintiff recover
against the defendant, or, alternatively, contribution from Fire-
stone as a joint tortfeasor. There was complete diversity be-
tween Firestone and both the plaintiff and defendant, and the
amount sought from Firestone was potentially more than
$10,000. Within thirty days after being brought into the suit,
Firestone filed petition and bond for removal from the state
court to the federal district court. The district court, however,
asserted that the rule in cases seeking removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) was equally applicable to the case at hand, and held
that the right to remove under section 1441(a) is limited to
plaintiff's defendants and is not available to third party de-
fendants. Fiblenskli v. Hirschbacek Motor Lines, Inc., 304: F.
Supp. 283 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
The question presented by this case, whether a third party
defendant may remove to a federal court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a), has been treated infrequently by the federal courts.
In fact, this point has been decided in only one other case,
White v. Baltic Conveyor 00.1 There have been, however, num-
erous decisions regarding the right of removal in cases of cross-
claim or counterclaim defendants,2 as well as third party de-
fendants seeking removal under the "separate and independent
1. 209 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.J. 1962).
2. See, e.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941);
West v. Aurora, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 139 (1868).
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claim" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).3 In most of these cases,
however, the courts have refused to grant removal.
4
In Fiblenski, the court noted that the right of removal is
entirely statutory and that the removal statute is to be con-
strued strictly.5 The court also distinguished the case at hand
from those permitting the right to remove under section
1441(c) :
Wherever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of actions, the entire case may be re-
moved and the district court may determine all issues
therein .... 0
Section 1441(c) has uniformly been construed to apply only to
plaintiff's defendantsJ The question in Fiblenski became, then,
whether a third party defendant was a defendant provided for
in section 1441(a) which reads:
[A]ny civil action brought in a state court of which the
district courts of the United States have original juris-
diction, may be removed by the defendant or defend-
ants, to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending."
For the answer to this question the court turned to Professor
Moore's treatise on federal practice. Professor Moore asks rhe-
torically, "Must the defendant be a plaintiff's defendant?" and
replies:
[W]e believe that the reference in the general removal
statute, § 1441, is only to plaintiff's (Professor Moore's
emphasis) defendants and does not include such de-
3. Sexton v. Allday, 221 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. Ark. 1963); White v. Baltic
Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716 (D.NJ. 1962).
4. Cases cited notes 2 & 3 supra. There is authority, however, that a new
party brought in by a cross bill, against whom an original defendant asks
affirmative relief, not involved in the original proceeding, may remove the
entire cause. See Habermel v. Mong, 31 F.2d 822 (6th Cir. 1929); Gregory
v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 112 F. Supp. 8 (D.N.C. 1953).
5. Fiblenski v. Hirschback Motor Lines, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Ark.
1969). There is considerable support for these positions. See Shamrock Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941); Great Northern Ry. v. Alexander,
246 U.S. 276 (1918); Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96
U.S. 199 (1878); White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.J.
1962); Williamson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 30 F. Supp. 629 (D.S.C. 1939).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 144(c) (1950).
7. Fountain Park Co-op, Inc. v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 289 F. Supp. 150 (1968); Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 241
F. Supp. 23 (1965).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
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fendants as third party defendants .... [l]f the
plaintiff and the plaintiff's defendants must, or have
chosen to adjudicate their suit in a state forum, we fail
to find a statutory right clearly given to other type
defendants, by the general removal § 1441, to choose a
federal forum.9
The court also noted that the federal courts in Arkansas have
agreed with Professor Moore in cases arising under section
1441(c).10 From this the court was persuaded that the rule that
has been applied in section 1441(c) cases was equally applicable
to this case and remanded the case to the state courts.
In the only other case on the question, the White case,11 the
court also relied quite heavily on Professor Moore's treatise in
reaching a similar result but it elaborated somewhat more on its
rationale. There the court emphasized that the acknowledged
policy was one of hostility to the expansion of federal jurisdic-
tion, and quoted Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets :12
Not only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence
the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of
the federal courts on removal, but the policy of the
successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of
federal courts is one calling for the strict construction
of such legislation . . . . Due regard for the rightful
independence of state governments, which should actu-
ate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously con-
fine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which
the statute has defined.' 3
The court then drew upon McCoy v. Siler 4 to add that it ap-
peared to place no hardship upon the third party defendant to
decide that it may not remove. It would be no more difficult,
the court said, for the third party to defend in the state courts
than in the federal courts.' 5 The court also pointed out that
section 1441(c) was intended to narrow the right to remove as it
9. IA J. MooPE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.157 [7] n.8, at 263-64 (2d ed. 1953).
10. Fiblenski v. Hirschbach Motor Lines, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Ark.
1969). The court cited Sexton v. Allday, 221 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. Ark. 1963) ;
Shaver v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959);
Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Ark
1951).
11. White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.J. 1962).
12. 313 U.S. 100 (1941). Accord, St. Paul Mercury Indemnity v. Red Cab
Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
13. 313 U.S. at 104, 109.
14. 205 F.2d 498 (3rd Cir. 1953).
15. White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D.N.J. 1962).
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had previously existed under the Judicial Code of 1911,16 and
concluded that section 1441(a) does not use the words "third
party defendant" but rather "defendant". To define "defend-
ant" to mean not only the original defendant but also a third
party defendant would be "an unwarranted act of judicial legis-
lation."' 7 In summation, the court held that by reason of: (1)
the policy to limit federal jurisdiction, (2) the lack of any fed-
eral statutory power that permits removal by a third party
defendant, and (3) the benefits resulting from having justice
administered by just one forum, the state courts, in regard to
both the main and ancillary complaints, the third party com-
plaint introduced in this case provided no basis for removal.""
The court's rationale is persuasive. Yet, when the purposes
behind the right of removal are considered, second thoughts
may arise. One purpose behind the creation of the right to re-
move a case from a state court to a federal court was to enable
a defendant sued in the courts of a state of which he is not a
citizen to obtain freedom from local prejudice or influence.' 9
Certainly a third party defendant may be as subject to local
prejudice as a plaintiff's defendant. For instance, a corporation
whose in-state plant had just closed, throwing hundreds of local
citizens out of work, might be subject to considerable local
prejudice as a third party defendant. The example is specu-
lative, but the point is there.
Of course, recognition of the right of removal in third party
defendants would also involve other considerations.
"[R]emoval of cases on the ground of diversity of citi-
zenship for trial in a state court is in derogation of
state sovereignty, since removal presupposes that the
state involved is incompetent or unwilling to provide
an impartial forum."
20
Further, it is the wise policy of Congress to relieve congestion
in the federal courts21 and expansion of the right of removal
could only add to that congestion. Finally, the increased dis-
appearance of hostility toward nonresident defendants is sig-
16. Id. at 720; See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 10
(1951) where the court stated: "The Congress, in the revision, carried out its
purpose to abridge the right of removal."
17. White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D.N.J. 1962).
18. Id. at 722.
19. 76 CJ.S. Removal of Causes § 1 (1952).
20. 32 Am. Jun. 2d Federal Practice & Procedure § 456 (1967).
21. Id.
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nificant. In view of these considerations, and those of the courts
previously presented, it would appear that limiting the right of
removal to plaintiff's defendants is the better rule, despite pos-
sible prejudice to third party defendants.
RoBERT B. PtADLMAN
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CORPORATIONS-Right to jury trial-Stockholders bringing
derivative action are entitled to trial by jury on legal issues
involved. Ross v. Benard (S. Ct. 1970).
The plaintiffs, stockholders of a closed-end investment cor-
poration, brought a derivative action against the corporate
directors and the corporation's brokers. The complaint alleged
that the brokers controlled the organization through an illegally
large representation on the board of directors in violation of the
Investment Company Act of 19401 and used the unlawful
representation to obtain excessive brokerage fees. Accusations
of gross negligence and of breach of contract were also made
against the directors. Both the directors and the brokers were
charged with a breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs demanded
an accounting, payment of the defendant's gains and profits,
and payment of the corporation's losses.
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in denying the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's
demand for a jury trial, held that the right to a jury trial was
to be determined as if the corporation were suing in its own
behalf, and that the fundamentally legal nature of the issues
involved entitled the plaintiff to such a trial.2 Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) an interlocutory appeal was taken to the court of
appeals, which reversed, holding that a stockholder's derivative
suit was exclusively an action in equity to which the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial did not apply.3 Certiorari was
granted, and the Supreme Court, in reversing, held "that the
right to jury trial attaches to those issues in derivative actions
as to which the corporation, if it had been suing in its own
right, would have been entitled to a jury."4 Ross v. Benard, 90
S. Ct. 733 (1970).
The seventh amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in
those actions which were entitled, at common law, to such a
trial.5 At the time, of the adoption of this amendment, the
1. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1964).
2. Ross v. Bernard, 275 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
3. Ross v. Bernard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
4. Ross v. Bernard, 90 S. Ct 733, 735 (1970).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served....
The amendment has been traditionally interpreted as granting a jury trial in
civil actions analogous or identical to those recognizable as common law actions
in 1791 when the amendment was adopted. This is the "historical test" that is
used in right to jury trial determination. See F. JAmxms, Czvm PRocanunn
§ 8.2 (1965).
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courts of law recognized the corporation's right to enforce legal
claims which were triable by jury.6 However, at this time, the
courts of law offered no relief to stockholders against the un-
scrupulous acts of corporate management. The American courts
of equity, after recognizing the need for such a cause of action,
assumed jurisdiction on the basis of a breach of trust relation-
ship.7 This theory was first applied in 1831.8 Later, the breach
of trust idea was integrated with the concept of the separate
corporate entity to provide a cause of action for the stockholders
against third parties.9 It was necessary for the stockholders to
bring a secondary or derivative suit in the corporation's name
to bring this action. Thereafter, the trustee doctrine was dis-
carded, and all suits brought by the stockholders against the
corporate management or third parties were classified in one
category with jurisdiction exclusively in equity.10
The entirely equitable nature of the derivative suit has been
recognized in virtually all the federal cases in which it has been
considered.' The prevailing view was admirably stated by the
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa:
A stockholder's derivative suit is an invention of the
courts of equity and is recognizable only in equity and
cannot be maintained at law .... Even if the claim, if
sued directly by the corporation, would be an action at
6. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMITENTARIES 475 (14th ed. 1803); cf. President
and Directors of Bank of Commonwealth v. Wister, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 318
(1829).
7. Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit: Notes on Derivation, 32
N.Y.U.L. REv. 980, 987 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Prunty]. According to
the author, the idea was first expressed by Chancellor Kent by way of dictum
in Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns Ch. 371, 389 (N.Y. 1817).
But, at the same time, I admit, that the persons who, from time
to time, exercise the corporate powers, may, in their character of
trustees, be accountable to this court for a fraudulent breach of
trust; and to this plain and ordinary head of equity, the jurisdic-
tion of this court over corporation ought to be confined.
It is noted that the American development of the stockholder's derivative suit
closely resembled the development of the suit in England, although there it
was looked upon as primarily a class action.
8. Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831), noted in Prunty at
988.
9. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855); Prunty at 992. A
demand on the corporation to bring suit was established as a precondition of
initiating a stockholder's derivative suit. This was a retention of the old
breach of trust doctrine and is reflected today in FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
10. 74 YALE L. J. 725, 732 (1965).
11. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548
(1949); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946); Miller v.
Weiant, 42 F. Supp. 760, 761 (S.D. Ohio 1942). The equitable nature of the
derivative suit is reflected in Equity Rule 94 of 1882 and Equity Rule 27 of
the Equity Rules of 1912. Contra, DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins.
Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
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law, yet, if enforced by means of a stockholder's deriva-
tive suit, it is prosecuted by an action in equity.12
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938
promulgated a merged system of law and equity.13 The Rules
were not interpreted by the courts to have any significant effect
on the seventh amendment nonavailability of a jury trial in a
derivative suit until DePinto v. Provident Security Life In-
surance Co.' 4 In DePinto, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit granted a jury trial in a derivative suit instituted by a
shareholder against the corporation's directors and officers. The
complaint alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty on
part of the officials in the purchase of worthless stock, and
recovery was sought in terms of money damages. Prior to this
decision, the historical equitable classification of the derivative
suit had precluded any seventh amendment jury determination
of the legal issues involved. The analysis which provided the
rationale for the decision in DePinto is basically that used by
the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernard."5
In Ross, the Court noted the development of the stockholder's
derivative suit in actions for treble damages under the antitrust
laws. In 1916, in Fleitmann v. Welsbacib Street Lighting Co.,'-
Justice Holmes questioned the denial to the defendants of a jury
trial simply because the stockholders were bringing suit instead
of the corporation.
[W]hy the defendants' right to a jury trial should be
taken away because the present plaintiff cannot per-
suade the only party having an interest in the cause of
action to sue,-how the liability which is the principal
matter can be converted into an incident of the plain-
tiff's domestic difficulties with the company that has
been wronged?
1 7
Interpreting the antitrust laws as requiring a jury assessment of
treble damages, Justice Holmes dismissed the case since the
12. Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
13. FED. R. CiV. P. 1: "These rules govern the procedure in the district
courts of the United States in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable
as causes at law or in equity . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 2: "There shall be one
form of action to be known as 'civil action.'" FED. R. CIv. P. 38(a) : "The
right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitu-
tion or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the
parties inviolate."
14. 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
15. 90 S. Ct. 733 (1970).
16. 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
17. Id. at 28.
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derivative suit was an action entertained only by the courts of
equity. In United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper
Co.,"8 the stockholder-plaintiff's claim for treble damages was
rejected by the Supreme Court on the basis that a shareholder
did not have standing at law to sue on a corporate claim. In
1953, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Fanohon and Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.19 held
that a stockholder's derivative suit could be brought for recov-
ery under the antitrust laws. Although the specific facts in that
case did not present the direct question of whether a jury trial
was permissible, the court stated:
The two major issues of right of the shareholder to sue
and of violation of the antitrust laws causing damage
to the corporation can be tried side by side or otherwise
... that one may go to the jury while the other does
not causes no difficulty.20
Although the basis for the right to jury trial in these cases
is statutory rather than constitutional, the analytical approach
taken by the courts in these actions was also used by the Court
in Ross.
The dual nature of the derivative suit as presented by the
Court in Ross consists of first, the traditional equitable issue
of the standing of the stockholder to bring the action and second,
the claim of the corporation, which may consist of either legal or
equitable issues. The historical unavailability of a jury trial on
the legal issues in a stockholder's derivative suit was attributed
by the Ross Court to the lack of an adequate remedy at law.
Under the separate systems of law and equity, the general prin-
ciple that a court of equity, after adjudicating an equitable
claim, would retain jurisdiction over subsequent legal issues has
been well established.
2 1
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938
removed the procedural difficulties that had existed between
the systems of law and equity prior to that. time. The Rules
created one action, "a civil action", in which all claims could
be brought and in which all remedies were available.22 Ross and
18. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
19. 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
20. Id. at 735.
21. See, e.g., American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937);
Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222 (1935); Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop,
278 U.S. 509 (1929).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 2: "There shall be one form of action to be known as
'civil action."'
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DePinto stand for the proposition that the Federal Rules re-
stored the right to a jury trial where it had always existed under
the seventh amendment but had been denied due to the proced-
ural differences between the separate systems of law and
equity.
23
The importance of providing and preserving the right to a
jury trial on legal issues under the merged system has often
been stressed by the Supreme Court. In 1959, the Court in
Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover24 held that the defendant was
entitled to a jury determination of issues common to his legal
counterclaim and the plaintiff's equitable claim. Previously, un-
der Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 the trial
judge had the discretion to set the sequence of trial. However,
the Supreme Court ordered the legal counterclaim be tried first,
so as not to raise the possibility of collateral estoppel and denial
of a jury trial on the legal issues. The Court stressed the impor-
tance of preserving the right to trial by jury.
Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of
such importance and occupies so firm a place in our his-
tory and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of
the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care.
20
In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,27 the Court held that a claim for
23. 49 CoRNELL L. REV. 664, 667 (1964). The right to a jury trial would
have existed under the seventh amendment "historical test" on the legal issues
involved.
24. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) : "When actions involving a common question of
law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial
of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) : "The
court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any sepa-
rate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a
statute of the United States."
26. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959).
27. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). The plaintiff sought an accounting in money dam-
ages and an injunction preventing further use of its trademark by the defend-
ant. The district court denied defendant's demand for a jury trial on the
grounds that the action was purely equitable, or if any legal issues were
presented, they were only incidental to the basic equitable claim. The court of
appeals upheld, but the Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily on Beacon in
asserting that the right to a jury trial of legal issues could not be denied even
where legal issues were incidental to the basic equitable claim.
[Vol. 22
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money damages, although incidental to a basic equitable claim
for injunctive relief, was a legal issue entitled to jury determi-
nation. More recently the Court emphasized that the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial does not depend on the character
of the over-all action but on the nature of the issues to be tried.28
Thus the underlying principle of Beacon, that only under the
most compelling circumstances can the right, to a jury trial on
legal issues be denied, presented a prevailing policy considera-
tion in the mind of the Ross Court.
In its holding, the Ross Court pointed out that the plaintiff
stockholders should be entitled to a jury trial, at a minimum, on
the issues of negligence and breach of contract. These were
recognized at common law as legal issues, and clearly the
seventh amendment preserves the right to trial by jury on them.
The dissent argued that the majority was using the seventh
amendment and the Federal Rules to enlarge the right to jury
trial in civil actions. The dual nature of the derivative suit used
in analysis by the majority was rejected; the dissent pointed out
that the suit had always been considered a unitary action with
jurisdiction exclusively in equity. Beacon and Daiy Queen were
distinguished from Ross in that both of these cases involved a
combination of issues that were recognizable as distinctly legal
and equitable at common law. In sum, the Court's decision was
termed "a reflection of an unarticulated but apparently over-
powering bias in favor of jury trials in civil actions."29
In Ross, the Court settled the conflict raised in the federal
courts by DePinto in 1963. Against the weight of precedent,
doctrine, and history, the Court relied on the flexibility of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the importance of pre-
serving the constitutional right to a jury trial to reach its
decision. The Court was careful to point out that the right to
a jury trial on legal issues in a derivative suit had always existed,
but had been denied due to procedural impediments. However,
it would appear that the court has expanded the seventh amend-
ment right to a jury trial in a practical sense if not in a creative
one.
Ricm A A. JoNsS, JR.
28. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
29. 90 S. Ct. at 745 (dissenting opinion).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Application of the doctrine of "mis-
conduct" in disciplinary proceedings by state university is a
deprivation of due process because based upon unconstitutionally
vague standards. Soglin v. Kauffman (7th Cir. 1969).
Plaintiffs, ten students of the University of Wisconsin and
members of the Madison campus chapter of the Students for a
Democratic Society, brought this suit for themselves and other
students, all of whom were suspended as a result of a protest
against Dow Chemical Corporation campus recruiters. The de-
fendants were various officials of the university, the State of
Wisconsin, and the city of Madison allegedly involved in the
administration of disciplinary actions on the Madison campus.
On October 18, 1967, plaintiffs and others protested the pres-
ence of recruiting representatives of the Dow Chemical Cor-
poration on the Madison Campus.' The manner in which the
protest was conducted was considered to be violative of the
university's standard of conduct, and on the following day the
Dean of Student Affairs suspended several of the plaintiffs and
others involved in the same incident, pending a hearing before
the Administrative Division of the Committee on Student Con-
duct and Appeals. On November 1, some of the plaintiffs and
other individuals received amended charges specifying the of-
fensive behavior ascribed to the plaintiffs. The charges stemmed
from the allegation that the plaintiffs had denied others' rights
to job interviews by physically obstructing the doorways and
corridors of a university building. This behavior, as chronicled
in the "Amended Charges" constituted "[m]isconduct, as well
as . . . other violations . . . of the University Policies on Use
of Facilities and Outside Speakers."
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the dis-
trict court, held that expulsion and prolonged suspension could
not be imposed as a result of allegations of misconduct without
reference to preexisting rules supplying an adequate guide be-
cause the possibility of a sweeping application of the standard
of misconduct to first amendment activities does not comport
with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. SogZin
v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
Traditionally, the relationship between university adminis-
trators and students, with regards to discipline, has not been
1. Ostensibly, the protest was in reaction to Dow's involvement in the
Vietnam war by virtue of the manufacture of napalm. Dow no longer holds
government contracts for the manufacture of napalm.
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the subject of judicial scrutiny. The administrative disciplinary
apparatus was considered sufficient by both student and admin-
istrator alike. However, in recent years there has been a tremen-
dous involvement by students in protest and demands to take
part in the decision making process. The ensuing disciplinary
actions on the part of administrators have lead students to the
courtroom. In the past, the courts have been hesitant to over-
ride university administrators.2
The first hurdle the student plaintiffs have encountered has
been the jurisdictional question of bringing their complaints
before the federal courts. State universities, as argued in
Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education,8 are state
agencies and thereby come within the ambit of section one of
the fourteenth amendment, thus guaranteeing substantive and
procedural rights to students. Jurisdiction of the federal courts
over universities as state agencies derives from 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which creates a cause of action against "[elvery person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any state . . .subjects . . . any citizen of the United
States .. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution."
A more difficult question with regards to jurisdiction is
raised in private schools. Some courts have held that a private
school is an agent of the state as a result of education being a
public function.4 Another case, Greene v. Howard University,
argued that the acceptance of state financial aid caused a private
university to become a state agency. The court rejected this,
holding that a private university is such by definition and re-
mains such regardless of the amount of state aid received.
However, the theory has been advanced that the relationship
between administrator and student in a private school is con-
tractual and thereby "understood and governed in terms of
contractual rather than constitutional principles." Students at
Columbia University in Grossner v. Columbia University
7
2. Greene v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), ree'd
without reaching Constitutional question, 412 F2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
3. 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
4. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203 F. Supp. 855
(E.D. La. 1962).
5. Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
6. Wilkinson, The Private College and Student Discipline, 56 A.B.A.J. 121
(1970). This article contains an excellent discussion of the legal relationship
of students and administrators in private school situations, especially with
regards to contractual relationship.
7. 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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argued a state action theory based on state and federal aid. The
court did not hold that the mere receipt of aid caused the
University to become a state agency. More importantly, the
court found that the state must be a direct participant in the
action that violates the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
A substantial number of cases involving student disciplinary
actions arise from alleged infringements of first amendment
rights. The valid exercise of first amendment rights is so basic
that it has been found necessary for the courts to counteract
possible "chilling effects on the exercise of first amendment
rights."8 An important case in this context is Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.9 In Tinker,
three public school students were suspended from school for
wearing black armbands to protest the government's involve-
ment in Viet Nam. The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized the right of students on school grounds to exercise first
amendment rights of free speech without improper interference
by school administrators.
In Soglin, the brunt of the decision rested on the fourteenth
amendment. The court did not consider the plaintiffs' conduct
which gave rise to their suspension, but rather "[w]hether de-
fendants were depriving plaintiffs of any constitutional rights
regardless of the character of their behavior." The defendants
contended that the doctine of misconduct was not a standard
as such, but rather was a statement of the University's inherent
power to discipline. This power has long been understood to be
an integral part of the mechanism for providing and promoting
education. The court made a distinction between inherent power
to discipline and the rules necessary to exercise that power.10
The court reasoned that "[t]he first desideratum of a system for
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules is an
obvious one: there must be rules."" Such rules must not be
"so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain
as to conduct ... . ,12 In Edwards v. Soutk Carolina,'3 involving
a "breach of peace" statute applied to protesters demonstrating
on the state capitol grounds, the Supreme Court held that such
a statute was too broad and all embracing, and thereby invali-
dated the statute. The "breach of peace" statute was not an
8. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
10. See Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
11. FULLER, THE MORALITV Or LAw 46 (fourth printing 1969).
12. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
13. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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"evenhanded application of a precise and narrowly drawn regu-
latory statute evincing a legislative judgement that certain
specific conduct be limited or proscribed.' 4 In Cameron v.
Johnson,'5 the court said that the state had a right by a precise
and narrowly drawn statute to prohibit conduct which unlaw-
fully blocked ingress and egress to a building. In a previous
case, Adderly v. Florida,'8 students, protesting a schoolmate's
arrest, blocked a non-public jail driveway. The court found the
applicable trespass statute as aimed at conduct of a limited
kind and complying with due process of law and equal pro-
tection under the law and therefore not unconstitutionally vague.
Today, students are vitally aware of the decision making
process. To ensure constitutional safeguards for protest and
dissent is to give no more to students than their birth right as
United States citizens. Universities must, and are, drafting
regulations with a sense of fair play that will, and does, generate
respect for authority and order. Student codes must clearly
"set out the duties and responsibilities of students and the disci-
plinary procedures applicable in case of violation."' 7 In Soglin
the standard of "misconduct" as used gave no direction to those
whom it sought to control as to what they might do that would
or would not be violative of such a standard.' 8 Similarly, the
standard furnished no guidelines to the administrators who en-
forced it.
KErT J. PERRY
14. Id. at 236.
15. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
,16. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
17. 418 F.2d at 168-69 n.7, citing THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ComminrEE
ON STUDENT CONDUCT AND APPEALS OF OCTOBER 2, 1967.
18. See also Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947
(D.S.C. 1967).
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